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Restrictive Trade Practices and the
Extraterritorial Application of U.S.
Antitrust and Trade Legislationt
Mark A. A. Warner*
I. INTRODUCTION
The Japan-U.S. economic relationship has been marked by tremendous
friction and misunderstanding. These tensions have given rise in the past to
the extraterritorial application of U.S. trade and antitrust laws to perceived
public and private restrictive trade practices. In this paper, I will review the
U.S. approach to the extraterritorial application of trade and antitrust laws,
particularly as they apply to Japan. I will conclude that although formal co-
ercion has given way to more bilateral negotiations, demands will grow for
a return to the more aggressive U.S. posture of the past unless meaningful
and effective market access is achieved. I will conclude with some observa-
t An earlier version of this paper was presented to the Japan-United States Study Group
on Economic Relations after the Uruguay Round Meeting held in Tokyo, Japan - March 23-
25, 1998.
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diate past Chair of the International Antitrust Committee of the American Bar Association
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leading Canadian trade law treatise, The Canadian Law and Practice of International Trade
(1997). He is also an Adjunct Professor of international competition law at the University of
Leiden in the Netherlands. Mr. Warner's views are his own, and do not necessarily reflect
the views of the OECD, or any of its Member States.
PERSPECTIVE: Restrictive Trade Practices
19:330 (1999)
tions that both sides might consider a mutually beneficial multilateral alter-
native as a possible step towards finding a more stable equilibrium in set-




U.S. law has long presumed that "legislation of Congress, unless a con-
trary intent appears, is meant to apply only within the territorial jurisdiction of
the United States."' The earliest Supreme Court case which undertook a
comparable task with respect to Section 1 of the Sherman Act determined that
the presumption against extraterritoriality had not been overcome.2 In Ameri-
can Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., the Court considered the application of
the Sherman Act in a civil action concerning conduct that occurred entirely in
Central America, and that had no discernible effect on imports to the United
States.3 Starting with what Justice Holmes termed "the general and almost
universal rule" holding "that the character of an act as lawful or unlawful
must be determined wholly by the law of the country where the act is
done,"4and the ancillary proposition that, in cases of doubt, a statute should
be "confined in its operation and effect to the territorial limits over which the
lawmaker has general and legitimate power,"5 the Court held that the defen-
dant's actions abroad were not proscribed by the Sherman Act.
By 1945, another court viewed a very similar problem differently. In
United States v. Aluminum Co. ofAm. ("Alcoa"), 6 the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals, sitting as a court of last resort, considered a civil action brought un-
der Section 1 of the Sherman Act against a Canadian corporation for acts
committed entirely abroad that, the government averred, had produced sub-
stantial anticompetitive effects within the United States. The Alcoa court
read American Banana narrowly. American Banana, Judge Learned Hand
wrote, stood only for the principle that "we should not impute to Congress an
intent to punish all whom its courts can catch, for conduct which has no con-
sequences within the United States."7 However, a sovereign ordinarily can
impose liability for conduct outside its borders that produces consequences
within them. Furthermore, while considerations of comity argue against ap-
1 EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244,248 (1991).
215 U.S.C. § 1.
3 American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347 (1909).
41d. at 356.
51d. at 357.
6148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
7Id. at 443.
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plying Section 1 to situations in which no effect within the United States has
been shown - the American Banana scenario - the statute, properly inter-
preted, does proscribe extraterritorial acts which were "intended to affect im-
ports [to the United States] and did affect them."8 On the facts of Alcoa,
therefore, the court concluded that the presumption against extraterritoriality
had been overcome, and that the Sherman Act had been violated.9
Any perceived tension between American Banana and Alcoa was eased
by the Supreme Court's most recent exploration of the Sherman Act's extra-
territorial reach. In Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California,10 by a 5-4 margin,
the justices endorsed Alcoa's core holding, permitting civil antitrust claims
under Section 1 to go forward despite the fact that the actions which allegedly
violated Section 1 occurred entirely on British soil. While noting American
Banana's initial disagreement with this proposition, Justice Souter, writing
for the majority in Hartford Fire, deemed it "well established by now that the
Sherman Act applies to foreign conduct that was meant to produce and did in
fact produce some substantial effect in the United States."" The conduct al-
leged in that case, a London-based conspiracy to alter the American insurance
market, met that benchmark.
The Hartford Fire Court stated that "[t]he only substantial question in
this litigation [is] whether there is in fact a true conflict between domestic
and foreign law.' 12 Justice Souter reasoned that no conflict exists where a
person subject to regulation by two states can comply with the laws of both.
Because the London reinsurers did not argue that British law required them
to act in some fashion prohibited by the law of the United States, or claim
that their compliance with the laws of both countries was otherwise impos-
sible, there was no conflict with British law. Accordingly, Souter saw no
need to address other considerations that might inform a decision to refrain
from the exercise of jurisdiction on grounds of international comity.
In a powerful dissent, Justice Scalia argued that the district court had
subject matter and personal jurisdiction in the case, and as a matter of leg-
islative jurisdiction the Sherman Act did not apply extraterritorially. 13 Fur-
ther, he noted that more recent lower court precedent tempered the
sId. at 444.
91d. at 444-45.
10509 U.S. 764 (1993).
'id. at 796 (citing Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 582
n.6 (1986) (considering allegations that petitioners, over a 20-year period, had illegally con-
spired to drive American firms from the American television set market by engaging in a
scheme to fix and maintain artificially high prices for television sets sold by petitioners in Japan
and, at the same time, to fix and maintain low prices for the sets exported to and sold in the
United States)).
121d. at 796, 798.
131d. at 814.
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extraterritorial application of the Sherman Act with considerations of "in-
ternational comity.' 14 He stated:
The "comity" they refer to is not the comity of courts, whereby judges
decline to exercise jurisdiction over matters more appropriately adjudged else-
where, but rather what might be termed "prescriptive comity": the respect sov-
ereign nations afford each other by limiting the reach of their laws. That
comity is exercised by legislatures when they enact laws, and courts assume it
has been exercised when they come to interpreting the scope of laws their leg-
islatures have enacted. It is a traditional component of choice-of-law theory.,
With respect to the majority's "true conflict" approach, Justice Scalia
cautioned:
It [the majority] concludes that no "true conflict" counseling nonapplica-
tion of United States law (or rather, as it thinks, United States judicial jurisdic-
tion) exists unless compliance with United States law would constitute a
violation of another country's law. That breathtakingly broad proposition,
which'contradicts the many cases discussed earlier, will bring the Sherman Act
14See Laker Airways Ltd. v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909, 938 & n.109
(D.C. Cir. 1984); Montreal Trading Ltd. v. Amax Inc., 661 F.2d 864, 869-871 (10th Cir.
1981); Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287, 1294-1298 (3d Cir.
1979); Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America, Nat'l Trust & Sav. Assoc., 549 F.2d
597, 608-615 (9th Cir. 1976). See also Pacific Seafarers, Inc. v. Pacific Far East Line, Inc.,
404 F.2d 804, 814 & n.31 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
5Hartford, 509 U.S. at 817. Justice Scalia adopted several of the factors enumerated in
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES (1986):
Under the Restatement, a nation having some "basis" for jurisdiction to prescribe law
should nonetheless refrain from exercising that jurisdiction "with respect to a person or
activity having connections with another state when the exercise of such jurisdiction is
unreasonable." Restatement (Third) § 403(l). The "reasonableness" inquiry turns on a
number of factors including, but not limited to: "the extent to which the activity takes
place within the territory [of the regulating state]," id., § 403(2)(a); "the connections,
such as nationality, residence, or economic activity, between the regulating state and the
person principally responsible for the activity to be regulated," id., § 403(2)(b); "the
character of the activity to be regulated, the importance of regulation to the regulating
state, the extent to which other states regulate such activities, and the degree to which
the desirability of such regulation is generally accepted," id., § 403(2)(c); "the extent to
which another state may have an interest in regulating the activity,' id., § 403(2)(g);
and "the likelihood of conflict with regulation by another state," id., § 403(2)(h).
Rarely would these factors point more clearly against application of United States law.
The activity relevant to the counts at issue here took place primarily in the United
Kingdom, and the defendants in these counts are British corporations and British sub-
jects having their principal place of business or residence outside the United States.
Great Britain has established a comprehensive regulatory scheme governing the London
reinsurance markets, and clearly has a heavy "interest in regulating the activity," id., §
403(2)(g). See 938 F.2d at 932-933; In re insurance Antitrust Litigation, 723 F. Supp.
464, 487-488 (N.D. Cal. 1989); see also J. Butler & R. Merkin, Reinsurance Law A.1.1-
02 (1992). Finally, § 2(b) of the McCarran-Ferguson Act allows state regulatory statutes
to override the Sherman Act in the insurance field, subject only to the narrow "boycott"exception set forth in § 3(b) - suggesting that "the importance of regulation to the
[United States]," Restatement (Thir § 403(2)(c), is slight. 
Considering these factors, I
think it unimaginable that an assertion of legislative jurisdiction by the United States
would be considered reasonable, and therefore it is inappropriate to assume, in the ab-
sence of statutory indication to the contrary, that Congress has made such an assertion.
Id. at 818-19.
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and other laws into sharp and unnecessary conflict with the legitimate interests
of other countries - particularly our closest trading partners.
In the more recent and apparently novel case of United States v. Nip-
pon Papers Industries, Co.,1 the First Circuit Court of Appeals has held
that even criminal antitrust claims under Section 1 may apply extraterritori-
ally where there is an intended and substantial effect in the United States.
Essentially, the court reasoned that since the Sherman Act uses the same
language for both the civil and criminal offenses, there was no legislative
intent to distinguish between the two.18 In that case, a federal grand jury
handed down an indictment in 1995, naming as defendant Nippon Paper In-
dustries, Co. ('"NPI"), a Japanese manufacturer of facsimile paper. The in-
dictment alleged that in 1990, NPI and certain unnamed coconspirators held a
number of meetings in Japan, which culminated in an agreement to fix the
price of thermal fax paper throughout North America. NPI and other manu-
facturers who were privy to the scheme purportedly accomplished their ob-
jective by selling the paper in Japan to unaffiliated trading houses on
condition that the latter charge specified (inflated) prices for the paper when
they resold it in North America. The trading houses then shipped and sold
the paper to their subsidiaries in the United States, who in turn sold it to
American consumers at swollen prices.
The indictment further stated that, in 1990 alone, NPI sold thermal fax
paper worth approximately $6,100,000 for eventual import into the United
States; and that in order to ensure the success of the venture, NPI monitored
the paper trail and confirmed that the prices charged to end users were those
that it had arranged. NPI moved to dismiss because, inter alia, if the conduct
attributed to NPI occurred at all, it took place entirely in Japan, and, thus, the
indictment failed to make out an offense under Section 1 of the Sherman Act.
The government opposed this initiative on two grounds. First, it claimed that
the law deserved a less grudging reading and that, properly read, Section 1 of
the Sherman Act applied criminally to wholly foreign conduct as long as that
conduct produced substantial and intended effects within the United States.
Second, the government claimed that the indictment, too, deserved a less
grudging reading and that, properly read, the bill alleged a vertical conspiracy
161d. at 820.
"7109 F.3d. I (1st Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S.Ct. 685 (1998), rehg denied, 118 S. Ct.
1116 (1998), 17 F. Supp. 2d38 (D. Mass. 1998), on remand, 1999 Lexis 11333 (D. Mass. July
16, 1999). The investigation has also spawned a number of private antitrust cases as well. See
Paper Systems Inc. v. Mitsubishi Corp., 967 F. Supp. 364 (E. D. Wis. 1997) (denying motion to
dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction), 177 F.RD. 435 (1997) (denying motion for certifica-
tion of a class).
'8This reasoning is doubtful because at the time of passage of the Sherman Act, the "ter-
ritorial" approach to jurisdiction was in vogue, and so it is particularly doubtful that Con-
gress intended to reach extraterritorial criminal conduct even where it had an effect on U.S.
commerce. See SPENCER WEBER WALLER, I ANTITRUST AND AMERICAN BUSINESS ABROAD
ch. 2 (3d ed., 1997).
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in restraint of trade that involved overt acts by certain coconspirators within
the United States. Accepting a restrictive reading of both the statute and the
indictment, the district court dismissed the case. 19
It is interesting to consider the position of the Japanese Government in
the Nippon case. In the appeal to the First Circuit, Japan filed an amicus
curiae brief:
It is neither the wish nor the intention of the Japanese Government to take
issue with the United States Government in this Court concerning the facts of
the particular case. The concern of the Japanese Government is instead with
the legal issue of the inappropriate reach and extent of United States legisla-
tion. The essence of the Japanese Government's position is that the conduct of
Japanese legal persons in the Japanese market is for the Japanese authorities to
regulate. Extraterritorial application of the Sherman Act is invalid under inter-
national law and violates Japanese jurisdiction.
20
In its brief in the appeal to the Supreme Court, Japan stated:
It is the opinion of the Government of Japan that if the First Circuit's de-
cision is allowed to stand, Section 1 of the Sherman Act will be applied in the
criminal context in a manner inconsistent with well established international
law. This will have profound implications for the sovereignty of Japan and for
customary relations between nations.21
In both briefs, Japan stressed that international cooperation pursuant to
bilateral or multilateral arrangements for mutual cooperation is the appro-
priate way to handle such conflicts even where criminal action is involved.
Interestingly, in the brief to the First Circuit, Japan went so far as to pub-
licly state that in respect of a 1992 related U.S. investigation into price-
fixing conspiracies in the thermal fax paper industry and pursuant to a U.S.
request, the Japanese Prosecutor's Office in 1994, raided and seized docu-
ments from the Tokyo headquarters of two Japanese companies, and se-
cured the cooperation of other Japanese companies from which the United
States sought additional documents. Furthermore, the Japanese Prosecu-
tor's Office - again at the request of the United States - questioned rep-
resentatives of Japanese thermal fax paper manufacturers in the presence of
representatives of the U.S. Department of Justice ("U.S. DOJ" or "DOJ").
As a result of these cooperative efforts, between 1994 and 1996, the United
States secured guilty pleas from three U.S. companies, four Japanese com-
panies (including the two whose premises had been searched by Japanese
authorities), and one Japanese national to criminal charges of price-fixing.
According to the brief, what distinguished the earlier case from the instant
case was that the meeting to fix prices in the earlier case occurred in the
United States, while in the instant case there was no allegation that any of
19944 F. Supp. 55, 64-66 (D. Mass. 1996).
20Brief of Amicus Curiae for the Gov't of Japan at 3, U.S. v. Nippon Paper Industries,
Co. (Ist Cir. 1996).
21 Brief of Amicus Curiae for the Gov't of Japan at 2-3, Nippon Paper Industries, Co. v.
U.S. (S. Ct. 1997).
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the defendants engaged in any acts in the United States giving rise to crimi-
nal liability.
22
On remand, the district court held on July 16, 1999 that the govern-
ment had not proven the existence of a price-fixing conspiracy involving
NPI within the period covered by the statue of limitations or that such a
conspiracy had intended and substantial effects on United States com-
merce. 23 The case demonstrated some interesting procedural and substantive
problems of prosecuting a criminal international conspiracy in U.S. courts.
On the procedural side, the Government sought to take the testimony
of a critical witness in Japan through either a videotaped deposition pursu-
ant to Fed. R. Crim. P. 15 or through the use of simultaneous video telecon-
ferencing - two different techniques for recording testimony with different
implications. The witness refused to come to the United States to testify
(ostensibly for health reasons) although he had agreed in a plea agreement
to be a cooperating witness. The government lacked the means to compel
his presence in the courtroom. 24 In response, NPI objected to the govern-
ment's motion for permission to take testimony by video deposition, but
agreed to video teleconferencing, The court granted the Government's Mo-
tion for Permission to Take Testimony by Video Teleconference, however
it did not, permit simultaneous transmission of the testimony in front of the
jury, rather the proceedings were taped, edited and replayed before the jury
during normal court hours.
In terms of substantive law, the First Circuit's decision holding that
criminal antitrust claims under Section 1 may apply extraterritorially where
there is a substantial effect in the United States created additional difficul-
ties. Section 1 jurisprudence has generally held that price-fixing agreements
prosecuted as criminal cases are per se illegal, while other agreements
prosecuted as civil cases are subject to a rule of reason analysis that could
involve an examination of the effects of the conspiracy.26 The district court
rejected a Ninth Circuit decision which held that an international price-
fixing, unlike a domestic price-fixing, is subject to a rule of reason analysis
in all cases.27 The district court held that the correct approach to a foreign
price-fixing conspiracy a "per se plus" test, adding to the traditional do-
mestic analysis the requirement that the government show substantial ef-
22 See supra note 20, at 4-5.
23See 1999 Lexis 11333 at 62.
24See 17 F. Supp. 2d at 38-39.
25 See id. at 43.26See 1999 Lexis 11333 at 52.27Metro Industries v. Sammi Corp., 82 F.3d 839, 845 (9th Cir. 1996), cert. denied 117
S.Ct. 189 (1997). While the Ninth Circuit based its decision on language from the well
known treatise PHILLIP ARBEDA & DONALD F. TURNER, 1 ANTITRUST LAW 237 (1978), the
district court cited a later edition of the same treatise, PHILLIP AREEDA & HERBERT
HOVEN AMP, 1 ANTITRUST LAW 273b, 379 (1997), as support for its own decision.
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fects by showing a substantial connection to the United States market. Ac-
cordingly, the court instructed the jury by saying that substantial effects
could be shown by proof that: the volume of commerce affected by the con-
spiracy was substantial; the share of the market allegedly impacted by al-
leged conspiracy was substantial; or the conspiracy as a whole substantially
lessened competition in the thermal fax paper market.28 The court held that
the government had succeeded on the first two prongs but only within the• • 29
relevant period covered by the statute of limitations.
An examination of third prong suggested by the court, namely proof
that the conspiracy substantially lessened competition in the United States,
brings the trade and competition interface dimension of the case into stark
relief. The evidence at trial demonstrated that U.S. producers had threat-
ened to initiate antidumping procedures against the Japanese exporters (who
accounted for 30% of the market as opposed to 70% by U.S. companies)
unless prices increased.30 There was wide agreement among witnesses that
throughout 1990 there was a substantial downward pressure on prices be-
cause of an oversupply of thermal fax paper, and the entire product line was
facing strong competition from "plain paper" fax machines. As the district
court noted that:
[t]he stakes were high: If the dumping charges were proved, the imports
of the offending companies would be subject to a tariff. Given the size
of their market share, the weakness of the product, and the oversupply
of thermal fax paper - any tariff increasing the cost of thermal fax paper
would likely drive these companies out of the American market. They
had to walk a fine line - raising prices to avoid a dumping charge,
without going so far as to eliminate their market share entirely. 1
Furthermore, she noted that "[t]here was the aroma of a setup in all of
this by the American companies seeking not just to eliminate their Japanese
rival's competitive edge, but to eliminate their Japanese rivals entirely.
3 2
The district court went on to hold that there simply was no substantial
lessening of competition in the U.S. market. The court's analysis is par-
ticularly trenchant. It said that:
28See supra 1999 Lexis 11333 at 58-59.
29See id.30See id. at 13.
31Id. at 14
32Id. And later on in the decision, the Court held that:
[f]inally, when the government's theory moved from price-fixing to price stabilization,
the evidence was even more tenuous. Given the severe downward pressure on prices, if
they stabilized at all during the period immediately following the March 30 meeting --
and as I describe there is reasonable doubt that they did for very long - it was as likely or
more likely to have been the result of the serious threat of (the U.S. company's) anti-
dumping petition as any conspiracy to fix prices. A reasonable jury could not accept the
latter version beyond a reasonable doubt.
Id. at 28.
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Oversupply of thermal fax paper, the pressures driving down prices, cou-
pled with the strength of the American competitors create a paradox in the core
of the government's case: If there had been a conspiracy to fix prices in March
of 1990, and prices were raised or even stabilized, that conspirator would im-
mediately lose customers, market share and in short order, any impact on the
American market. If, recognizing that, a conspirator jumped ship at the first
opportunity, abandoning all efforts to increase or stabilize prices, then it would
have abandoned the conspiracy. Indeed, the record reflects that both hap-
pened.33
Time will tell whether the "Per Se Plus" standard for assessing inter-
national price-fixing cases that the government elects to bring on a criminal
theory will survive further judicial scrutiny in this or other cases. However,
this case demonstrates the very difficult factual and evidentiary burden that
the government will have in cases of this kind.34 Furthermore, the predicate
context of antidumping threats raises serious questions whether this or any
international case of alleged price-fixing should ever be prosecuted crimi-
nally, let alone under a per se theory. Bear in mind that it is extremely un-
likely that the competitive pricing of the Japanese firms would have been
illegal in a purely domestic price discrimination or predatory pricing con-
text, and so there would have been no reason to even contemplate a price-
fixing conspiracy. Nor would it have made sense in a purely domestic
context for producers with 30% market share to undertake a price stabiliza-
tion conspiracy in response to threats from the dominant producers.
2. The Agencies 'International Guidelines
In April 1995, the U.S. DOJ and the Federal Trade Commission
("FTC") ("Agencies") jointly issued the most recent iteration - and the
first jointly issued - of the Antitrust Enforcement Guidelines for Interna-
tional Operations ("Guidelines"). These Guidelines are an important
statement of when the Agencies might apply the antitrust laws extraterrito-
rially. Section 3.1 sets forth the Agencies view about jurisdictional issues.
Based on the case law discussed above, Section 3.1 states that:
Anticompetitive conduct that affects U.S. domestic or foreign commerce
may violate the U.S. antitrust laws regardless of where such conduct occurs or
the nationality of the parties involved .... With respect to foreign import
commerce, the Supreme Court has recently stated in Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v.
California that "the Sherman Act applies to foreign conduct that was meant to
produce and did in fact produce some substantial effect in the United States."
Second, with respect to foreign commerce other than imports, the Foreign
Trade Antitrust Improvements Act of 1982 ("FTAIA") applies to foreign con-
33See id. at 18-19.
341t is worth noting that the trial was rendered very difficult by conflicting translations of
terms as critical to the case as "agreement", and evidence of cross-cultural understanding.
See id. at 19-22.
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duct that has a direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effect on U.S.
commerce. [emphasis added.]
Section 3.11, dealing with jurisdiction over conduct involving import
commerce, states that imports into the United States by definition affect the
U.S. domestic market directly, and will, therefore, almost invariably satisfy
the intent part of the Hartford Fire test. However, whether imports in fact
produce the requisite substantial effects will depend on the facts of each
case.
35
The FTAIA amended the Sherman Act to provide that the Sherman Act
shall not apply to conduct involving trade or commerce (other than import
trade or commerce) with foreign nations unless:
(1) such conduct has a direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable ef-
fect:
(A) on trade or commerce which is not trade or commerce with foreign
nations, or on import trade or import commerce with foreign nations; or
(B) on export trade or export commerce with foreign nations, of a person
engaged in such trade or commerce in the United States;
(2)such effect gives rise to a claim under the provisions of [the Sherman
Act], other than this section.
Section 3.121 of the Guidelines states that to the extent that conduct in
foreign countries does not "involve" import commerce but does have an
"effect" on either import transactions or commerce within the United States,
the Agencies apply the "direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable"
standard of the FTAIA. That standard is applied, for example, in cases in
which a cartel of foreign enterprises, or a foreign monopolist, reaches the
U.S. market through any mechanism that goes beyond direct sales, such as
the use of an unrelated intermediary, or in cases in which foreign vertical
restrictions or intellectual property licensing arrangements have an anti-
competitive effect on U.S. commerce.36
35 See U.S. DEP'T OF JUsTICE & FED. TRADE COMM., ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT
GUIDELINES FOR INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS 13 (1995), reprinted in [Jan. - June 1995] 68
Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1707, Spec. Supp. (April 6, 1995) [hereinafter
Guidelines]. Illustrative Example A of the Guidelines states:
Situation: A, B, C, and D are foreign companies that produce a product in various for-
eign countries. None has any U.S. production, nor any U.S. subsidiaries. They organize a
cartel for the purpose of raising the price for the product in question. Collectively, the
cartel members make substantial sales into the United States, both in absolute terms and
relative to total U.S. consumption. Discussion: These facts present the straightforward
case of cartel participants selling products directly into the United States. In this situation,
the transaction is unambiguously an import into the U.S. market, and the sale is not com-
plete until the goods reach the United States. Thus, U.S. subject matter jurisdiction is
clear under the general principles of antitrust law expressed most recently in Hartford
Fire. The facts presented here demonstrate actual and intended participation in U.S.
commerce.
Id.36See id. at 14. Illustrative Example B of the Guidelines states:
Situation: As in Illustrative Example A, the foreign cartel produces a product in several
foreign countries. None of its members has any U.S. production, nor do any of them have
339
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B. Outbound Commerce
1. Antitrust laws
(a) The Agencies' Guidelines
Section 3.122 states that with respect to jurisdiction in cases under sub-
section I(B) of the FTAIA there are two categories of "export cases" that
fall within the FTAIA's jurisdictional test. First, the Agencies may, in ap-
propriate cases, take enforcement action against any anticompetitive con-
duct, regardless of where it occurs, that restrains U.S. exports, so long as (1)
the conduct has a direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effect on
exports of goods or services from the United States, and (2) the U.S. courts
can obtain jurisdiction over persons or corporations engaged in such con-
duct.
Section 3.2 explains more fully that if the conduct is unlawful under
the importing country's antitrust laws as well, the Agencies are also pre-
pared to work with that country's authorities if that country's authorities are
better situated to remedy the conduct, and if those authorities are prepared
to take action that will address the U.S. concerns, pursuant to their antitrust
laws. Second, the Agencies may, in appropriate cases, take enforcement
action against conduct by U.S. exporters that has a direct, substantial, and
reasonably foreseeable effect on trade or commerce within the United
States, or on import trade or commerce. This can arise in two principal
ways. First, if U.S. supply and demand were not particularly elastic, an
agreement among U.S. firms accounting for a substantial share of the rele-
vant market, regarding the level of their exports, could reduce supply and
raise prices in the United States. Second, conduct ostensibly export-related
could affect the price of products sold or resold in the United States.37 This
U.S. subsidiaries. They organize a cartel for the purpose of raising the price for the prod-
uct in question. Rather than selling directly into the United States, however, the cartel
sells to an intermediary outside the United States, which they know will resell the product
in the United States. The intermediary is not part of the cartel. Discussion: The jurisdic-
tional analysis would change slightly from the one presented in Example A, because not
only is the conduct being challenged entered into by cartelists in a foreign country, but it
is also initially implemented through a sale made in a foreign country. Despite the differ-
ent test, however, the outcome on these facts would in all likelihood remain the same.
The fact that the illegal conduct occurs prior to the import would trigger the application
of the FTAIA. The Agencies would have to determine whether the challenged conduct
had "direct, substantial and reasonably foreseeable effects" on U.S. domestic or import
commerce. Furthermore, since "the essence of any violation of Section 1 [of the Sherman
Act] is the illegal agreement itself- rather than the overt acts performed in furtherance
of it," the Agencies would focus on the potential harm that would ensue if the conspiracy
were successful, not on whether the actual conduct in furtherance of the conspiracy had
in fact the prohibited effect upon interstate or foreign commerce.
Id.37See id. at 16-17. Illustrative Example D of the Guidelines states:
Situation: Companies E and F are the only producers of product Q in country Epsilon,
one of the biggest markets for sales of Q in the world. E and F together account for 99
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kind of effect could occur if, for example, U.S. firms fixed the price of an
input used to manufacture a product overseas for ultimate resale in the
United States.38
(b) The Case Law
The U.S. rhetoric in this regard has been more aggressive than its ac-
tions. Thus far the only "pure export" cases have involved civil consent de-
crees, one against a Japanese buying cartel dealing with U.S. sellers, 39 and
percent of the sales of product Q in Epsilon. In order to prevent a competing U.S. pro-
ducer from entering the market in Epsilon, E and F agree that neither one of them will
purchase or distribute the U.S. product, and that they will take "all feasible" measures to
keep the U.S. company out of their market. Without specifically discussing what other
measures they will take to carry out this plan, E and F meet with their distributors and,
through a variety of threats and inducements, obtain agreement of all of the distributors
not to carry the U.S. product. There are no commercially feasible substitute distribution
channels available to the U.S. producer. Because of the actions of E and F, the U.S. pro-
ducer cannot find any distributors to carry its product and is unable to make any sales in
Epsilon. Discussion: The agreement between E and F not to purchase or distribute the
U.S. product would clearly have a direct and reasonably foreseeable effect on U.S. export
commerce, since it is aimed at a U.S. exporter. The substantiality of the effects on U.S.
exports would depend on the significance of E and F as purchasers and distributors of Q,
although on these facts the virtually total foreclosure from Epsilon would almost certainly
qualify as a substantial effect for jurisdictional purposes. However, if the Agencies be-
lieve that they may encounter difficulties in establishing personal jurisdiction or in ob-
taining effective relief, the case may be one in which the Agencies would seek to resolve
their concerns by working with other authorities who are examining the transaction.
Id.
3 See id. at 17-18. Illustrative Example E of the Guidelines states:
Situation: Companies P, Q, R, and S, organized under the laws of country Alpha, all
manufacture and distribute construction equipment. Much of that equipment is protected
by patents in the various countries where it is sold, including Alpha. The companies all
belong to a private trade association, which develops industry standards that are often
(although not always) adopted by Alpha's regulatory authorities. Feeling threatened bycompetition from the United States, the companies agree at a trade association meeting
(1) to refuse to adopt any U.S. company technology as an industry standard, and (2) to
boycott the distribution of U.S. construction equipment. The U.S. companies have taken
all necessary steps to protect their intellectual property under the law of Alpha. Discus-
sion: In this example, the collective activity impedes U.S. companies in two ways: their
technology is boycotted (even if U.S. companies are willing to license their intellectual
property) and they are foreclosed from access to distribution channels. The jurisdictional
question is whether these actions create a direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable
effect on the exports of U.S. companies. The mere fact that only the market of Alpha ap-
pears to be foreclosed is not enough to defeat such an effect. Only if exclusion from Al-
pha as a quantitative measure were so de minimis in terms of actual volume of trade that
there would not be a substantial effect on U.S. export commerce would jurisdiction be
lacking. Given that this example involves construction equipment, a generally highly
priced capital good, the exclusion from Alpha would probably satisfy the substantiality
requirement for ETAIA jurisdiction. This arrangement appears to have been created with
particular reference to competition from the United States, which indicates that the ef-
fects on U.S. exports are both direct and foreseeable.
Id.39United States v. C. Itoh & Co., 1982-83 Trade Cas. (CCH) 65,010 (W.D. Wash. Oct.
20, 1982) (proposed final judgment and consent decree).
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another in which a U.K. defendant engaged in at least some conduct in the
United States which restrained U.S. exports of glass-making technology.40
In one private antitrust suit that predates the FTAIA, Daishowa Inter-
national v. North Coast Export Co. an association of U.S. wood chip ex-
porters alleged that a group of Japanese importers engaged in market
allocation, price-fixing and group boycotts. 41 The court held that subject
matter jurisdiction existed because of the effect on U.S. export commerce
despite the fact the conduct alleged involved only Japanese nationals in Ja-
pan.
In United States v. C. Itoh & Co., the complaint alleged that the pri-
mary markets for processed tanner crab were the United States and Japan.
In 1980, approximately two-thirds of the tanner crab harvested from waters
off Alaska were processed for export to Japan. Over twenty Japanese com-
panies, principally through their U.S. subsidiaries, purchased such crab in
1980, paying a combined total of nearly $48 million. The defendants pur-
chased, directly or through their U.S. subsidiaries, large quantities of proc-
essed Alaska seafood, including processed tanner crab, from Alaska
processors for importation to Japan. In 1980, the eight defendants ac-
counted for more than fifty percent of the purchases made by Japanese
firms of tanner crab processed in the Dutch Harbor-Akutan area of the
Alaska peninsula, the most important tanner crab processing region of
Alaska. The defendants paid Alaska processors approximately $24 million
in total in 1980 for processed tanner crab.
The defendants were members of the Japan Marine Products Importers
Association ("JMPIA"), a trade association located in Tokyo, Japan, whose
membership includes the major Japanese seafood importers. The JMPIA
operated through a number of committees, including a crab committee that
deals with processed crab imported from Alaska. Beginning at least as
early as 1979, the defendants used the JMPIA crab committee as a forum to
discuss, agree upon, and coordinate prices to be offered to Alaska proces-
sors for processed tanner crab. Defendants also communicated among
themselves outside the context of JMPIA meetings to coordinate the con-
duct of price negotiations with, and the price offers to be made to, Alaska
processors for the purchase of processed tanner crab. The complaint al-
leged that the combination and conspiracy had the following effects, among
others: (a) the prices paid for processed tanner crab were fixed at and de-
pressed to artificial and non-competitive levels; (b) Alaska processors were
deprived of the benefits of free and open competition in the purchase of
processed tanner crab; and (c) competition in the purchase of processed
tanner crab was restrained.42
40United States v. Pilkington plc., Part IV(D), 59 Fed. Reg. 30604 (proposed final judg-
ment and competitive impact statement, June 14, 1994).
41 1982-83 Trade Cas. (CCH) 65,010 (W.D. Wash. Oct. 20, 1982).
42 See supra note 40.
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In United States v. Pilkington plc., the government alleged that the de-
fendants violated Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act by enforcing and
maintaining agreements and understandings that unreasonably restrain in-
terstate and foreign trade in the construction and operation of float glass
plants and in float glass process technology, and by monopolizing the world
market for the design and construction of float glass plants. Specifically,
the complaint alleged that, without sufficiently valuable intellectual prop-
erty rights and through a network of bilateral patent and know-how license
agreements and various understandings with most other float glass manu-
facturers in the world, defendants:
(a) Allocated and divided territories for, and limited the use of, float glass
technology worldwide;
(b) Interpreted and enforced the territorial and use restrictions in the li-
cense agreements so that their combined effect prevented competitors from
using or developing competing float glass technology;
(c) Required competitors to prove that all of the licensed technology had
become publicly known before being relieved of the territorial and use restric-
tions;
(d) Imposed and enforced restrictions on competitors' ability to sublicense
float glass technology;
(e) Imposed and enforced reporting and grant-back provisions in the li-
cense agreements;
(f) Imposed and enforced restrictions on exports of glass by licensees
from and to the United States; and
(g) Continued enforcement of the territorial, use, and sublicense restric-
tions indefinitely, even after no further licensing royalties were payable and the
licensed patents had expired.
The complaint also alleged that Pilkington had monopolized the world
market for the design and construction of float glass plants through license
agreements that impose unreasonable restrictions on licensees and by other
predatory and exclusionary conduct. Finally, the complaint alleged that the
conduct described above has had and continues to have direct, substantial,
and reasonably foreseeable adverse effects on U.S. export trade and com-
merce in providing services and related equipment and materials for the de-
sign and construction of float glass plants outside the United States.
43
2. Trade Laws
With respect to the trade laws, Section 301 outlines certain practices
that are subject to discretionary remedial action by the United States Trade
Representative ("USTR"). Section 301(d)(3)(B) defines acts, policies, and
practices that are "unreasonable" and include, but are not limited to, any
act, policy, or practice, or any combination of acts, policies, or practices,
which while not necessarily in violation, or inconsistent with international
43See supra note 28.
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legal rights of the United States, is otherwise unfair and inequitable but
which
(i) denies fair and equitable...
(IV) market opportunities, including the toleration by a foreign govern-
ment of systematic anticompetitive activities by enterprises or among enter-
prises in the foreign country that have the effect of restricting, on a basis that is
inconsistent with commercial considerations, access of United States goods or
services to a foreign market...44
Further, "[fjor purposes of determining whether any act, policy, or
practice is unreasonable, reciprocal opportunities in the United States for
foreign nationals and firms shall be taken into account, to the extent appro-
priate.A
As a matter of U.S. law, it would appear that regarding agreements
covered by the World Trade Organization ("WTO") with respect to both the
mandatory and discretionary provisions of Section 301 of the Trade Act of
1974, the duty of the USTR to take remedial action is triggered only after
she has requested consultations, and requested proceedings on the matter
under the formal WTO,46 and after such procedure is concluded.47 With re-
spect to matters not subject to a covered agreement, recourse to the WTO
cannot be considered to be a priori necessary or appropriate either accord-
ing to the WTO Understanding48 or according to U.S. law. In President







48Article 23:1 of the Uruguay Round WTO Settlement Understanding mandates that
when WTO members seek the redress of a violation of obligations or other nullification or
impairment of benefits under the "covered" WTO agreements or an impediment to the at-
tainment of any objective of the covered agreement. (The covered agreements are: the
Agreement Establishing the WTO; The Multilateral Trade Agreements, including the Multi-
lateral Agreement on Trade in Goods, General Agreement on Trade in Services, Agreement
on TRIPS, and the Understanding; and the Plurilateral Agreements to the extent determined
by the parties to the Plurilateral agreements themselves). Final Text of the GATT Uruguay
Round Agreement, Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of
Disputes, Annex 2, Apr. 15, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 128 (1994) [hereinafter Understanding].
Article 23:2 further mandates that Members shall not unilaterally determine whether such
conditions are met without following the rules and procedures set out in the Understanding.
Similarly, members are mandated to follow the rules and procedures in the Understanding
with respect to determining whether another Member is implementing recommendations and
rulings in a reasonable period of time, and in determining the level of suspension of conces-
sions or other obligations in the event that the other Member has not implemented the rec-
ommendations and rulings. Therefore, with respect to "covered agreements" according to the
WTO Understanding, the WTO is pivotal with respect to U.S.-Japan economic disputes.
However, as WTO members are sovereign states, the WTO cannot be considered to be a
mandatory dispute settlement mechanism because it does not have the authority to force any
Member to change its non-conforming laws or policies but instead only allows for compen-
sation and the suspension of concessions or other obligations. In that limited sense, the WTO
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Clinton's Statement of Administrative Action ("SAA") to Congress with re-
spect to the Understanding, he stated: "[N]either Article 23 nor Section 301
requires the united States to use DSU procedures when the USTR considers
that an investigation does not involve a [covered agreement]." 9 This
wording suggests that the decision as to whether a matter is subject to a
covered agreement, is to be determined exclusively by the USTR, not by
any other Member of the WTO. In the SAA, the President stressed the in-
tent to use Section 301 to pursue vigorously foreign unfair trade practices
that violate U.S. rights or deny benefits to the United States under the cov-
ered agreements, and to pursue foreign unfair trade practices that are not
covered by those agreements. In particular the SAA states:
For example, with minor exceptions, the [covered agreements] do not ad-
dress governmental measures that encourage or tolerate private, anticompeti-
tive practices. Should the USTR elect to investigate the failure by a foreign
government to take action against systematic, anticompetitive distribution
practices, including reciprocal dealing, exclusivity or tying arrangements, that
deny access to U.S. firms, section 301 will also remain fully available to chal-
lenge such a failure. 50
With respect to anticompetitive practices generally, the SAA states:
Among the foreign government practices that section 301 ... defines as
"unreasonable" are those that deny fair and equitable market opportunities, in-
cluding toleration by a foreign government of systematic anticompetitive ac-
tivities. The Administration will enforce vigorously the "toleration of...
anticompetitive activities" provision in section 301 when appropriate to ad-
dress foreign anticompetitive behavior. The practices covered by the provision
include, but are not limited to, toleration of cartel behavior or toleration of
closed purchasing behavior (including collusive coercion of distributors or
customers) that precludes or limits U.S. access in a concerted or systematic
way.... In making an assessment, the USTR will consider whether the perti-
nent foreign government, and especially its competition authorities, have been
made aware of the alleged practices and, if so, how they were informed, the
relevant evidence that has been provided to, or is known to be available to, the
foreign authorities, and the nature of response those authorities have made.
51
The SAA makes clear that where the foreign government practice at is-
sue involves some "covered" actions and some action that is not covered,
the dispute settlement proceedings will be initiated only with respect to the
covered actions, while the non-covered actions would be addressed
may be considered to be "almighty" in that Members must request the authorization of the
WTO Dispute Settlement Board in order to suspend concessions or other obligations. Id.
4 9
URUGUAY ROUND TRADE AGREEMENT, TExTS OF AGREEMENT, IMPLEMENTING BILL,
STATEMENT OF ADMINISTRATIVE AcrION AND REQUIRED SUPPORTING STATEMENTS, H.R.
Doc. No. 103-316, at 349 (2d. Sess. 1994). See also id. at 366 ("Neither section 301 nor the
DSU will require the USTR to invoke DSU dispute settlement procedures if the USTR does
not consider that a matter involves a [covered Agreement].").37 Id. at 366.
511d. at 367.
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bilaterally. Further, the SAA states that the United States retains the right
to apply section 301 sanctions that may be inconsistent with U.S. trade ob-
ligations, or take section 301 actions that are not auhtorized under the Gen-
eral Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ("GATT") 52 as in the past with respect
to semiconductors, pharmaceuticals, beer and hormone-treated beef.
Despite the clear language in the SAA, it must be noted that with re-
spect to U.S. disputes over automobiles and automobile parts sales in Japan,
in 1995 the United States stepped away from Section 301 and/or WTO
remedies, opting instead for a Comprehensive Bilateral Agreement.5 3 Al-
though there have been mixed results under the Agreement, there has been
no further resort to Section 301 or WTO remedies in this regard.5 4 Simi-
larly, with respect to the U.S.-Japan dispute over access to the Japanese
market for photographic film, the United States opted to pursue a WTO dis-
pute settlement strategy rather than to pursue an outright Section 301 a
proach, leading some commentators to conclude that Section 301 is dead.
5
5233 I.L.M. 1141 (1994).
53 See generally, Report to President William Jefferson Clinton of the Interagency En-
forcement Team Regarding the US.-Japan Agreement on Autos and Auto Parts: Fourth Re-
port, Prepared by the U.S. Department of Commerce and the Office of the U.S. Trade
Representative (December 4, 1997).
54 See id.
55See Kodak-Fuji WTO Decision: Hearing of the East Asia and Pacific Affairs Subcom-
mittee of The Senate Foreign Affairs Committee, March 4, 1998 (statement of Clyde
Prestowitz, President, Economic Strategy Institute); but c.f. id. The following is testimony of
Susan Esserman, then General Counsel (now deputy U.S. Trade Representative) of the Office
of the U.S. Trade Representative:
SEN. THOMAS: You're very welcome. Glad you could be here. I want to probably talk
just a little more about the process rather than the detail. We have a number of trade
agreements with Japan - isn't that correct? MS. ESSERMAN: Yes. SEN. THOMAS: In
fact quite a number. MS. ESSERMAN: Quite a number. SEN. THOMAS: Forty or what-
ever. What is the conflict if there is what we think to be something that is inconsistent
with one of these agreements and WTO? I guess what I am saying is when you enter into
WTO do you have a certain set of operational standards, and what happens to your
agreements? How do these two things work together? How are unilateral agreements in
WTO? MS. ESSERMAN: If we have rights under WTO agreements, then we have an
opportunity to enforce those agreements through this new WTO binding dispute settle-
ment system. So we can take a case to the WTO, litigate it, and if we prevail seek resolu-
tion of the market access problem. The bilateral agreements are a separate track, and
they've been a very important part of our approach to Japan over the years. And that is
that we work intensively with Japan to resolve market access problems. Those agree-
ments, if there is a violation of those agreements, we look at the full range of tools avail-
able under U.S. la and through further negotiation to try to address .the problem. Those
are not addressable if it's strictly a violation of a bilateral agreement that does not impact
on other WTO violations, and those are not addressable at the WTO. SEN. THOMAS: So
in this instance, assuming that some of the allegations of less than open market probably
were conflicting with our agreement as well as WTO? You chose to go the WTO route -
you could have gone the other route - is that true? MS. ESSERMAN: We chose the
WTO route because we thought it was a potential avenue for addressing this problem. We
very much believe that Japan's actions nullified concessions that they had given us. We
are not at this point saying Japan has violated a specific existing bilateral agreement.
What we are saying now is that the government of Japan has made very formal represen-
tations before a world body, and we are going to hold them to that and take appropriate
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III. RECENT U.S.-JAPAN CASES
A. Cartels
Perhaps the most apt analogy to describe the current situation with re-
spect to the extraterritorial application of U.S. antitrust and trade laws is to
the Cold War, which was followed by a gradual warning in disarmament
talks, bouts of an escalating arms race, and finally alliances for peace and
security embracing former adversaries. In antitrust and trade disputes be-
tween the United States and Japan, the weapons have been requisitioned
and delivered, but to this point no serious shots have really been fired.
I discussed the criminal fax paper prosecution above, but this hardly
seems worthy of the elaborate unilateral economic weaponry amassed by
the United States. The current U.S. emphasis on international antitrust has
concentrated almost exclusively on cartel behavior.56 There are other types
of activity that have been the subject of prosecutions of international con-
spiracies - the sodium gluconate (industrial cleaner) market involving
U.S., Japanese, Dutch and French companies; 57 in graphite electrodes in-
action if there is not - if they do not hold to their representation. SEN. THOMAS: But if
you felt like they hadn't violated your agreement, what basis are you going to have to
take bilateral action? MS. ESSERMAN: Well, we want to look at - we actually - the
goal is to achieve market access here. That's what - we hope that Japan will live up to
its representations. That is our goal, to achieve market access for Japan. That is the goal
- not to take particular action. SEN. THOMAS: And if they don't? MS. ESSERMAN:
And if they don't we're going to have to look at a full range of our actions. We have
various opportunities under U.S. law and we - SEN. THOMAS: Could you be a little
more specific? I've - we've had so much of this strong language - MS. ESSERMAN:
Yes. SEN. THOMAS: - take responsible steps - what specifically are you talking
about? MS. ESSERMAN: Well, we can pursue specific negotiations. We also have our
own trade laws, including Section 301, and that is a potential avenue for action. SEN.
THOMAS: But you don't know yet whether there was - MS. ESSERMAN: We are go-
ing to wait and see. We hope that Japan will live up to its obligations. That is what we
hope for. That is what will serve Kodak's interests. If they don't we are going to have to
look at the most effective way of proceeding.56Ass't Att'y Gen., Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep't of Justice, Joel Klein, Criminal Enforce-
ment in a Globalized Economy, Paper Presented at the Advanced Criminal Antitrust Work-
shop: A Practical Approach to Criminal Investigations (Feb. 20, 1997) ; Dep. Ass't Att'y
Gen., Antitrust Div. U.S. Dep't of Justice, Gary Spratling, Making Companies an Offer They
Shouldn't Refuse: The Antitrust Division's Corporate Leniency Policy - An Update, Paper
Presented to the Bar Association of the District of Columbia 35th Annual Symposium on
Antitrust and Associations (Feb. 16, 1999); and Dep. Ass't Att'y Gen., Antitrust Div. U.S.
Dep't of Justice, Gary Spratling, International Cartel Prosecutions: Antitrust Division's
Policies Relating to Plea Agreements in International Cases, Paper Presented to the Thir-
teenth Annual National Institute on White Collar Crime (March 4, 1999).
57 U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, JAPANESE CHEMICAL GIANT TO PAY $ 20 MILLION FINE (Press
Release) (February 25, 1998); U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, FRENCH COMPANY AGREES TO PAY
$2.5 MILLION FINE FOR PARTICIPATING IN INTERNATIONAL PRICE FIXING CONSPIRACY (Press
Release) (December 17, 1997); U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, Two DUTCH COMPANIES PLEAD
GUILTY TO INTERNATIONAL PRICE FIXING: SENTENCED TO PAY $10 MILLION CRIMINAL FINE
(Press Release) (September 24, 1997).
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volving a U.S., German and Japanese companies; 5 in marine construction
and transport services involving U.S., Dutch and Belgian companies; 59 in
citric acid involving U.S., German, Dutch and Swiss companies; in the ly-
sine (a food and feed additive) market involving U.S., Korean and Japanese
companies; 61 in maltol and sodium erythorbate (two food additives) in-
volving a U.S. company; 62 in sorbates involving U.S., German and Japanese
companies; 63 in vitamins involving French, Swiss and German companies;
64
and in tampico fiber involving a Mexican company.65 In fact, of the twenty-
three cartel cases where Sherman Act violations have yielded fines in ex-
cess of U.S. $10 million, only five have involved Japanese companies (22%
of the total). If one considers only the international cartel cases, Japanese
companies accounted for five out of twenty of those cases (just over 25% of
58 U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, JAPANESE SUBSIDIARY CHARGED WITH INTERNATIONAL
CONSPIRACY TO FIX PRICES FOR GRAPHITE ELECTRODES IN THE U.S. (Press Release) (February
23, 1998) ; U.S. DEP'T. OF JUSTICE, U.S COMPANY AGREES TO PAY $110 MILLION FINE FOR
INTERNATIONAL CONSPIRACY (Press Release) (April 7, 1998); U.S. DEP'T. OF JUSTICE, TOKAI
CARBON Co. LTD. To PLEAD GUILTY AND PAY FINE IN GRAPHITE ELECTRODE CONSPIRACY
(Press Release) (April 29, 1999); U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, GERMAN COMPANY AND CHIEF
EXECUTIVE OFFICER EACH AGREE To PAY RECORD FINES FOR INTERNATIONAL CONSPIRACY
(Press Release) (May 4, 1999).
59 U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CHARGED WITH INTERNATIONAL CONSPIRACIES, THREE
COMPANIES TO PAY SECOND LARGEST FINE IN ANTITRUST HISTORY (Press Release) (Decem-
ber 22, 1997).
60 
U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, DUTCH COMPANY CHARGED WITH PRICE FIXING ON CITRIC ACID:
AGREES TO PAY $400,00 CRIMINAL FINE (Press Release) (June 23, 1998); U.S. DEP'T OF
JUSTICE, BAYER SUBSIDIARY AGREES TO PAY $50 MILLION CRIMINAL FINE (Press Release)
(January 29, 1997).
6 1U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, FORMER TOP ADM EXECUTIVES, JAPANESE EXECUTIVE,
INDICTED IN LYSINE PRICE FIXING CONSPIRACY (Press Release) (December 3, 1996); U.S.
DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ARCHER DANIELS MIDLAND CO. TO PLEAD GUILTY AND PAY 100 MILLION
FOR ROLE IN Two INTERNATIONAL PRICE FIXING CONSPIRACIES (Press Release) (October 15,
1996); U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, JUSTICE DEPARTMENT TAKES FIRST ACTION AGAINST
INTERNATIONAL FOOD AND FEED ADDITIVE PRICE FIXERS (Press Release) (August 27, 1996).62U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, U.S. PHARMECEUTICAL GIANT AGREES To PAY CRIMINAL FINES
FOR PARTICIPATING IN Two INTERNATIONAL PRICE-FixING CONSPIRACIES (Press Release)
(July 19, 1999)
63 U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, EASTMAN CHEMICAL COMPANY AGREES To PLEAD GUILTY To
PRICE- FIXING AND PAY $11 MILLION CRIMINAL FINE (Press Release) (September 30, 1998);
U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE GERMAN CHEMICAL GIANT CHARGED WITH PARTICIPATING IN 17
YEAR INTERNATIONAL PRICE-FIXING CONSPIRACY (Press Release) (May 5, 1999); U.S. DEP'T
OF JUSTICE, JAPANESE CHEMICAL COMPANY THIRD To BE CHARGED IN 17 YEAR
INTERNATIONAL PRICE-FIXING CONSPIRACY (Press Release) (July 14, 1999)
64 U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, FIVE EXECUTIVES, ONE COMPANY CHARGED WITH PRICE-FIXING
AND AGREE To COOPERATE IN WORLDWIDE VITAMINS PRIcE-FIXING CONSPIRACY (Press Re-
lease) (March 2, 1999) AND U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, F. HOFFMAN LAROCHE AND BASF
AGREE TO PAY RECORD CRIMINAL FINES FOR PARTICIPATING IN INTERNATIONAL VITAMIN
CARTEL (Press Release) (May 20, 1999).
65
U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, MEXICAN-BASED TAMPICO PRODUCER AND TEXAS DISTRIBUTOR
CHARGED WITH PRICE FIXING (Press Release) (September 26, 1996).
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the total). The fines over $10 million collected to date total $1.51 billion, of
which the fines imposed on the five Japanese companies totaled $90 million
(just over 6% of the total).66 The five U.S. companies on this list accounted
for just over 17% of the total fines. By contrast, European companies ac-
counted for around 57% of the companies involved, and just over 77% of
the total fines.67
While Japanese companies figure prominently on this list, this does not
necessarily represent a discriminatory or selective focus on Japan given that
in 1998 Japan was the third largest trading partner of the United States (af-
ter Canada, and the European Union, and just before Mexico) in terms of
total goods exports and imports, and in terms of goods imports alone.68
Moreover, none of these markets would seem to be the focus of current
U.S.-Japan disputes. Furthermore, it is not possible from the available pub-
lic record to gauge the extent, if any, of Japanese governmental participa-
tion in any of these investigations as was the case for some of the fax paper
investigations. In short, despite the rhetoric, the recent record with respect
to the extraterritorial enforcement of U.S. antitrust and trade laws to alleged
Japanese cartel behavior seems hardly impressive.
B. Market Access
As discussed above, the extraterritorial application of U.S. antitrust
trade laws with respect to market access concerns has not been any more of
a problem in recent years in the dispute over the Japanese market for photo-
graphic film. This matter began as an antitrust matter. Kodak filed lengthy
papers in a Section 301 proceeding, alleging that Fuji used rebates to obtain
exclusivity in violation of Japan's Antimonopoly Act, and cooperated in il-
legal resale price maintenance that prevented Kodak from using low price
to gain market share. However, Kodak, apparently did not initially bring its
66See supra notes 57-65; Gary R. Spratling, Deputy Ass't Att'y Gen., Antitrust Division,
U.S. Dep't of Justice, Are the Recent Titanic Fines in Antitrust Cases Just the Tip of the Ice-
berg, Speech to the Twelfth Annual National Institute on White Collar Crime (Mar. 6, 1998).
67 See id.68United States Trade Representative, 1998 Annual Report of the President on the Trade
Agreements Program and 1999 Trade Policy Agenda (1999) at Chapter III, Tables 2 and 4.
This is even more evident considering that in 1998 Canada and Europe accounted for just
over 21% of total U.S. goods trade, while Japan and Mexico each accounted for around 11%
of total U.S. goods trade. These data also demonstrate that Japanese companies account for
around twice as many of these cases as the Japanese share of either total trade with the
United States, or total United States imports, while their European counterparts account for
around three times as many of these cases as either their share of total U.S trade or imports.
Alternatively stated, the ratio of the Japanese share of these fines to the Japanese share of
total U.S. trade or imports is around 0.5, while for Europe the ratio is around 4.0. Interest-
ingly, Canadian firms do not figure in the list of firms paying fines over $10 million. It is not
clear why this is the case. Perhaps, it says something about the Canadian enforcement efforts
against cartels, or the nature and extent of the bilateral cooperation relationship between the
Canadian and U.S. competition authorities.
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evidence to either the U.S. Department of Justice Antitrust Division, or to
the Japan Fair Trade Commission. Subsequently in August 1996, Kodak
did complain to the Japanese Fair Trade Commission ("JFTC") (at the di-
rection of USTR at the time of filing the WTO panel case in June 1996),
which investigated and found no grounds for any major action, but an-
nounced that it would periodically monitor the Japanese market for photo-
graphic film.
69
For the most part, the U.S. antitrust concerns relating to the Japanese
film market were not the subject of the formal WTO dispute settlement pro-
cedures. Instead the United States requested consultations with the Japan
under a 1960 GATT Contracting Parties' Decision on Restrictive Business
Practices: Arrangements for Consultations ("Decision"), which had appar-
ently never been used before. 70 In particular, the United States sought con-
sultations with respect to: factors and conditions (such as market structure
and government measures) relating to the structural and competitive envi-
ronment in which business practices take place; all practices that the United
States believes restrict competition in international trade; mutually satis-
factory conclusions, which may include commitments by Japan to take cer-
tain actions to eliminate the restrictive business practices of concern or
remove the restrictions on competition in international trade; and the scope
of practices that are not limited to practices that Japan has found, or would
have grounds to find, to be a violation of Japanese antitrust law.71 In the De-
cision, the contracting parties recommend that, at the request of any con-
tracting parties, a contracting party should enter into consultations on harmful
restrictive practices in international trade on a bilateral or multilateral basis as
appropriate. If it agrees that such harmful effects are present, it should take
such measures as it deems appropriate to eliminate these effects.
Given the breathtakingly broad scope of coverage requested by the
United States, it is not surprising that Japan chose not to accept the requested
consultations. The U.S. request purported to use a multilateral framework,
but in fact, the nature of the request went very deep into the sovereign
authority of the government of Japan to determine whether its laws had been
violated, and whether a violation should be found even where no Japanese
law was even implicated. This might be termed an example of "soft-
extraterritoriality" or extraterritoriality by convergence and consultation. As I
69See Kodak Cites Private Anticompetitive Practices in JFTC Complaint, INSIDE U.S.
TRADE (Aug. 9, 1996).
7 0 See Restrictive Business Practices: Arrangements for Consultations, Nov. 18, 1960,
GATT B.I.S.D. (9th Supp.) at 28-29 (1961); see also Letter from U.S. Ambassador Booth
Gardner to Ambassador Minoru Endo, Permanent Mission of Japan to the WTO (Aug. 21,
1996), reprinted in INSIDE U.S. TRADE, Aug. 30, 1996, at 1, 21-23 [hereinafter Gardner Let-
ter].
71 See Gardner Letter, supra note 70.
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will discuss more fully below, this has tended to be the model for U.S. extra-
territoriality with respect to Japan in recent years.
Some antitrust issues, however, did survive in the actual WTO com-
plaint. The WTO panel found that with respect to certain Japanese gov-
ernmental "measures" taken by the Japanese competition authority, the JFTC
fell inside its terms of reference and were properly before the Panel.72 Some
other JFTC measures, however, were excluded.73 In the Panel proceedings,
the United States and Japan first addressed the U.S. claims of non-violation
nullification or impairment under GATT 1947 Article XXIII: 1(b), followed
by those dealing with allegations of violations of specific GATI Articles 111:4
(national treatment) and X: 1 (publication and administration of trade regula-
tions) under Article XXIII: 1(a) WTO dispute settlement procedures.
The text of Article XXIII: 1(b) establishes three elements that a com-
plaining party must demonstrate in order to make out a cognizable claim un-
der Article XXIII:1(b): (1) application of a measure by a WTO Member; (2) a
benefit accruing under the relevant agreement; and (3) nullification or im-
pairment of the benefit as the result of the application of the measure. I shall
proceed with my analysis by considering in turn each of these three elements.
In beginning its analysis, the panel set forth a broad interpretation of non-
violation that would also address issues of competition. The panel stated that:
In GATT jurisprudence, most of the cases of non-violation nullification
or impairment have dealt with situations where a GATT-consistent domestic
subsidy for the producer of a product has been introduced or modified follow-
ing the grant of a tariff concession on that product. The instant case presents a
different sort of non-violation claim. At the outset, however, we wish to make
clear that we do not a priori consider it inappropriate to apply the Arti-
cle XXIII: 1(b) remedy to other governmental actions, such as those designed
72The panel found that the specific "measures" were the subject of the US claims, and that
were within their terms of reference. The first set were the "Distribution countermeasures", in-
cluding the 1967 JFTC Notification 17 on Premiums to Businesses, the 1967 Cabinet Decision
on Liberalization of Inward Direct Investment, the 1970 Guidelines for Rationalizing Terms of
Trade for Photographic Film, and the 1971 Basic Plan for the Systemization of Distribution.
The second set were the Restrictions on large retail stores, including the 1974 Large Stores
Law, and the 1979 Amendment to the Large Stores Law. Finally, the third set were the "Pro-
motion "countermeasures", including the 1967 JFTC Notification 17 on Premiums to Busi-
nesses, the 1967 Cabinet Decision on Liberalization of Inward Direct Investment, the 1977
JFTC Notification 5 on Premiums to Consumers, the 1981 JFTC Guidance on Dispatched Em-
ployees, 1982 Self-Regulating Rules Concerning Fairness in Trade with Business, the 1982
Establishment of Fair Trade Promotion Council, the 1984 Self-Regulating Standards Concern-
ing Display of Processing Fees for Colour Negative Film, and the 1987 JFTC approval of the
Retailers Fair Competition Code and its enforcement body, the Retailers Fair Trade Council.
73E.g., 1971 JFTC Rule No. I under Article 6 of the Antimonopoly Law (International
Contract Notification Requirement); 1971 JFTC Notification No. 34 on open lotteries; and
1983 JFTC guidance on the establishment of rules on loss-leader advertising and dumping. See
WTO Panel Report with respect to Japan - Measures Affecting Consumer Photographic
Film and Paper, complaint by the United States, Findings at para 10.20 (WT/DS44/R 31,
March 1998) Panel Report Adopted 22 April 1998.
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to strengthen the competitiveness of certain distribution or industrial sectors
through non-financial assistance. Whether assistance is financial or non-
financial, direct or indirect, does not determine whether its effect may offset
the expected result of tariff negotiations. Thus, a Member's industrial policy,
pursuing the goal of increasing efficiency in a sector, could in some circum-
stances upset the competitive relationship in the market place between domes-
tic and imported products in a way that could give rise to a cause of action
under Article XXIII:1(b). In the context of a Member's distribution system, for
example, it is conceivable that measures that do not infringe GATT rules could
be implemented in a manner that effectively results in a disproportionate im-
pact on market conditions for imported products. In this regard, however, we
must also bear in mind that tariff concessions have never been viewed as cre-
ating a guarantee of trade volumes, but rather, as explained below, as creating
expectations as to competitive relationships.74
In Japan, it is accepted that the government sometimes acts through what
is referred to as administrative guidance.75 In such a case, the company re-
ceiving guidance from the Government of Japan may not be legally bound to
act in accordance with it, but compliance may be expected in light of the
power of the government and a system of government incentives and disin-
centives arising from the wide array of government activities and involve-
ment in the Japanese economy.76 As noted by the parties, administrative
guidance in Japan takes various forms. It may be "regulatory administrative
guidance," which effectively substitutes for formal government action or
promotional administrative guidance, where companies are urged to do things
that are in their interest to do in any event.77 Accordingly, the panel went be-
yond the previous GATT jurisprudence developed in the 1988 GAIT Panel
Report on Japan - trade in semiconductors - a case brought by the Euro-
pean Community.7 8 The panel stated that:
In our view, a government policy or action need not necessarily have a
substantially binding or compulsory nature for it to entail a likelihood of com-
pliance by private actors in a way so as to nullify or impair legitimately ex-
pected benefits within the purview of Article XXIII:I(b). Indeed, it is clear
that non-binding actions, which include sufficient incentives or disincentives
for private parties to act in a particular manner, can potentially have adverse
effects on competitive conditions of market access. For example, a number of
non-violation cases have involved subsidies, receipt of which requires only
voluntary compliance with eligibility criteria. Moreover, we also consider it
conceivable, in cases where there is a high degree of cooperation and collabo-
ration between government and business, e.g., where there is substantial reli-
ance on administrative guidance and other more informal forms of
741d. 10.38 (emphasis added).
75See generally, OECD Regulatory Reform in Japan, Chapters 3 and 4, 59 (1999).
76See id.
77 See supra note 73 at 10.44.
78Derestriction of Future Panel Report - Decision by the Council of 4 May 1988,
GATT B.I.S.D. (35th Supp.) at 331-35 (1988).
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government-business cooperation, that even non-binding, hortatory wording in
a government statement of policy could have a similar effect on private actors
to a legally binding measure or what Japan refers to as regulatory administra-
tive guidance. Consequently, we believe we should be open to a broad defini-
tion of the term measure for purposes of Article XXIII:l(b), which considers
whether or not a non-binding government action has an effect similar to a
binding one.
79
Similarly, the panel concluded that the past GATT cases demonstrate
the fact that an action taken by private parties does not rule out the possibility
that it may be deemed to be governmental if there is sufficient government
involvement. The panel stated that "[i]t is difficult to establish bright-line
rules in this regard, however. Thus, that possibility will need to be examined
on a case-by-case basis."'
There is a problem, however, that would soon arise for the United
States' chances of succeeding on the non-violation complaint (and also on the
violation complaints as well because the panel applied the same analysis for
those complaints, correctly or incorrectly) related to the proof of causation.
The panel held that in this case, it was up to the United States to prove that
the governmental measures that it cited have upset the competitive relation-
ship between domestic and imported photographic film and paper in Japan to
the detriment of imports. In other words, the United States had to show a
"clear correlation between the measures and the adverse effect on the relevant
competitive relationships.""1 Simply put, it could not. Pointedly, with respect
to the distribution measures, the panel concluded that:
The essence of the US claim in respect of distribution "countermeasures"
is that Japan created vertical integration and single-brand distribution in the
Japanese film and paper market. In the US view, this was done through stan-
dardization of transaction terms, systemization and limitations on premiums to
businesses. As we have found above, the United States has not been able to
show that the various "measures" it cites have upset competitive relationships
between domestic and US film and paper in Japan, principally because single-
brand distribution appears to have occurred before and independently of those
"measures," but also because the United States has not demonstrated that these
"measures" are directed at promoting vertical integration or single-brand dis-
tribution. In answering the timing problem, the United States has provided no
convincing evidence or arguments that the cited "measures" in fact had the ef-
fect of reinforcing single-brand distribution. Equally, the United States has not
explained why the vertically integrated, single-brand distribution structure of
the film sector in Japan - a state of affairs that the evidence suggests is simi-
lar to that occurring elsewhere in the world (including in the United States) -
would have broken down in the absence of continuing government interven-
tion.
8 2
"9Supra note 54, 10.49.
"aid. 10.56.811d. 10.82.
82Id. 10.204 (emphasis added).
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The panel then went on to analyze the violation complaints under the
same analysis, holding that "measures" as used in GATT Article XXITI:(1)(b)
are equivalent to the GATT Article I:4 "laws, regulations, and requirements
affecting (the) internal sale, offering for sale, purchase, transportation, distri-
bution or use." The panel stated that:
We recall our earlier findings that none of the eight distribution "meas-
ures" cited by the United States had been shown to discriminate against im-
ported products, either in terms of a de jure discrimination (a measure that
discriminates on its face as to the origin of products) or in terms of a defacto
discrimination (a measure that in its application upsets the relative competitive
position between domestic and imported products, as it existed at the time
when a relevant tariff concession was granted). In this connection, it could be
argued that the standard we enunciated and applied under Article XXIII: 1(b)
- that of "upsetting the competitive relationship" - may be different from
the standard of "upsetting effective equality of competitive opportunities" ap-
plicable to Article 111:4. However, we do not see any significant distinction
between the two standards apart from the fact that this Article 111:4 standard
calls for no less favourable treatment for imported products in general, whereas
the Article XXIII:1(b) standard calls for a comparison of the competitive rela-
tionship between foreign and domestic products at two specific points in time,
i.e., when the concession was granted and currently.... Here, as in our exami-
nation of the same measures in light of the US claim of non-violation nullifi-
cation or impairment, the evidence cited by the United States indicates that the
measures neither (i) discriminate on their face against imported film or paper
(they are formally neutral as to the origin of products), nor (ii) in their applica-
tion have a disparate impact on imported film or paper... Additionally, as we
also noted earlier, single brand wholesale distribution is the common market
structure - indeed the norm - in most major national film markets, including
the US market. It is unclear why the same economic forces acting to promote
single brand wholesale distribution in the United States would not also exist in
Japan.... Accordingly, and essentially for the reasons already stated in our
findings on non-violation nullification and impairment, we find that the United
States has failed to demonstrate that any of the distribution "measures" in issue
accords less favourable treatment to imported film and paper than to film and
paper of Japanese origin. The US claim under Article m:4 must therefore be
rejected. 3
If a challenge to the panel decision were to be mounted, it would most
likely be with respect to the collapsing of the non-violation and violation
analyses into one. It has long been well established that there is no "market
power" or "market effect" test under Article m of GAT. 4
In short, the United States gambled on the WTO dispute settlement
option, and although it apparently lost on the facts, if not the law, the
United States has not resorted either to a direct appeal of the decision
3Id. 10.380-10.382 (emphasis added).
84 See, e.g., Canada - Administration of the Foreign Investment Review Act (FIRA),
Feb. 7, 1984, GATT B.I.S.D. (30th Supp.) at 167 6.6 (1984).
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(which arguably would be necessary under U.S. law before embarking on
any Section 301 action having brought the dispute to the WTO in the first
place) or to any controversial Section 301 action. Instead, the USTR has
announced that it would regard the Japanese Government's representations
to the WTO panel, including those relating to Japan's distribution policies
administered by the JFTC, access to large stores, and enforcement of com-
petition laws - as commitments subject to an interagency monitoring
scheme. 5 The only Administration reference to Section 301 came from the
General Counsel to the USTR in an extended exchange in recent congres-
sional hearings. 6
It is also worth noting that in President Clinton's October 1, 1997
Identification of Trade Expansion Priorities Pursuant to Executive Order
12901 regarding "Super 301," 87only one priority foreign country practice
was identified - Korean barriers to auto imports, and four WTO cases
were announced in respect of Japanese fruit testing, Canadian dairy export
subsidies and import quotas, EU dairy export subsidies, and Australian ex-
port subsidies on automotive leather. That being said, it is worth adding
that the same report touts the use of sanctions by the Federal Maritime
Commission to address certain Japanese port practices. Certain other key
industries, notably autos and auto parts and flat glass are (despite varied re-
suits) subject to ongoing bilateral agreements, while the United States
would like to bring certain others such as paper and paper products under
bilateral agreements.
C. Other Bilateral Initiatives
It is not difficult to determine why the U.S. extraterritorial economic
arsenal has not been fully deployed against the alleged anticompetitive
practices in Japan. The bilateral economic relationship is now largely gov-
erned by the June 10, 1993 Framework for a new Economic Partnership
("Framework Agreement") announced by President Clinton and then-Prime
Minister Miyazawa and by the June 1997 Enhanced Initiative on Deregula-
tion and Competition Policy ("Enhanced Initiative") announced by Presi-
dent Clinton and Prime Minister Hashimoto.
The Framework Agreement addressed sector-specific barriers and
structural obstacles to trade, emphasizing objective quantitative and quali-
tative criteria for monitoring and implementing each agreement. The En-
85 U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, USTR AND DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE ANNOUNCE
NEXT STEPS ON IMPROVING ACCESS TO THE JAPANESE MARKET FOR FILM (Press Release)
(Feb. 3, 1998). Japan has apparently indicated that it does not find it necessary or appropriate
to participate in this initiative, and rejected the idea that its WTO panel submissions could be
regarded as commitments.86 See supra, note 56.
87As extended by Exec. Order No. 12,973, 60 Fed. Reg. 51665 (1995).
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hanced Initiative stresses structural issues relating to distribution and com-
petition policy generally. 8
The 1997 Submission listed priorities for action by the Japanese Gov-
ernment relating to inter alia: wholesale distribution and structurally exclu-
sionary markets;8 9 JFTC enforcement policy; private remedies for
injunctions and damages under the Anti-Monopoly Act; elimination or sub-
stantial reduction of all exemptions to the Anti-Monopoly Act; JFTC prose-
cution of bid-rigging; and expanded budget, resources, and position of the
JFTC in Cabinet meetings regarding economic policy.
The 1998 Submission listed priorities for the Japanese Government
relating to inter alia: customs/import processing; retailing and services;
transportation and warehousing; competition policy advocacy; private
remedies; anticartel enforcement; distribution; Anti-Monopoly Act exemp-
tions; Merger Policy; and JFTC Budget and Resources.9"
The United States credits this initiative in leading to the abolition as of
June 1, 2000, of the Large Scale Retail Store legislation, which allegedly
increased the length and uncertainty for gaining approval for new construc-
tion of large stores. 91 The replacement legislation will limit the ability of
local governments only to restrict floor space, operating hours, and opening
88Submission by the Government of the United States to the Government of Japan Re-
garding Deregulation, Competition Policy and Transparency and Other Government Prac-
tices in Japan (Nov. 7, 1997) [hereinafter 1997 Submission]. Submission by the Government
of the United States to the Government of Japan Regarding Deregulation, Competition Pol-
icy and Transparency and Other Government Practices in Japan (Oct. 7, 1998) [hereinafter
1998 Submission]
89 As stated in the 1997 Submission, supra note 89:
Several Japanese markets (e.g., flat glass, paper and photographic film) have common
characteristics often associated with noncompetitive performance, including: (1) highly
oligopolistic market structures; (2) a high degree of vertical integration between the main
manufacturers and primary distributors or de facto exclusive arrangements between the
manufacturer and primary distributors; (3) use by manufacturers of various measures
(e.g., security deposits, rebates) to hinder primary distributors from distributing competi-
tors products beyond a token level; (4) a history of collusion; and (5) low import compe-
tition.
Id. at 16-18. See also, F.M. Scherer, Retail Distribution Barriers to International Trade 67
ANTITRUST L.J. 77 (1999); Sadao Nagaoka & Akira Goto, Vertical Restraints and Market
Access 24 EMPIRICA 21 (1997).
9°See 1998 Submission, supra note 89.
9 1 U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, U.S.-JAPAN ENHANCED INITIATIVE ON DEREGULATION
AND COMPETITION POLICY - FACT SHEET 3 (May 15, 1998) [hereinafter 1998 FACT SHEET].
See also FIRST JOINT STATUS REPORT ON THE U.S.-JAPAN ENHANCED INITIATIVE ON
DEREGULATION AND COMPETITION POLICY 8 (May 15, 1998) [hereinafter 1998 STATUS
REPORT]. U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, U.S.-JAPAN ENHANCED INITIATIVE ON
DEREGULATION AND COMPETITION POLICY - FACT SHEET (May 3, 1999) [hereinafter 1999
FACT SHEET]. See also SECOND JOINT STATUS REPORT ON THE U.S.-JAPAN ENHANCED
INITIATIVE ON DEREGULATION AND COMPETITION POLICY 8 (May 3, 1999) [hereinafter 1999
STATUS REPORT].
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days or other such transparent criteria.92 In the 1999 Status Report, Japan
further agreed to measures by which the Ministry of International Trade and
Industry ("MITI") would supervise the adoption of the local laws to ensure
that the purposes of the law are not impeded.93
Furthermore, Japan has undertaken to have MITI and the JFTC con-
sider expanded private injunctive remedies for violations of the Antimo-
nopoly Act, and substantial reform to the exemption system to the
Antimonopoly Act.94 In 1999, JFTC undertook a number of commitments
to increase anti-cartel enforcement, including actively filing criminal accu-
sations with the Prosecutor's Office in such cases.95 Japan has also agreed
to take further steps to act against bid-rigging, amending its bidding in-
structions to make clear that firms cannot consult with competing firms
about price when bidding on a project.
96
Additionally, under the Enhanced Initiative, the JFTC agreed in 1998
to survey Japan's top 2,000 firms to assess their compliance programs as
part of its efforts to more vigorously enforce its antitrust laws. The JFTC
also agreed in 1998 to begin following up on its industry surveys to ensure
that firms take appropriate actions to correct practices about which the
JFTC has raised concerns, including the film and glass sectors.98 Moreover,
the JFTC agreed to monitor Japanese manufacturers to ensure that they do
not restrict foreign competition by threatening retaliation against distribu-
tors who handle imported products.99
These may be examples of bilateral initiatives, however they still in-
volve a significant degree of coercion. In fact, having regard to the actual
practice under Section 301,100 one might ask whether Section 301 is alive
and well but functioning under another name. However, one might also ask
whether the lack of a real coercive threat is sustainable unless significant
92See 1999 STATUS REPORT, supra note 92.
93See 1999 STATUS REPORT, supra note 92, at 16-17.94See 1998 STATUS REPORT, supra note 92, at 11; 1999 STATuS REPORT, supra note 92 at
20, 22.
95See 1999 FACT SHEET, supra note 92, at 13-14.
96See Id.97See 199 FACT SHEET, supra note 92, at 4.98 See Id.
99See Id. See also 1998 STATUS REPORT, supra note 92, at 10-11. For a critique of JFTC
enforcement of antitrust cases involving market access, see Hiroko Yamane & Shingo Seryo,
Restrictive Practices and Market Access in Japan: Has the JFTC Been Effective in Elimi-
nating Barriers in Distribution, WORLD COMPETITION (June 1999)
1°Merit E. Janow, U.S. Trade policy Towards Japan and China: Integrating Bilateral,
Multilateral and Regional Approaches, in TRADE STRATEGIES FOR A NEW ERA: ENSURING
U.S. LEADERSHIP IN A GLOBAL ECONOMY 175 (Geza Feketekuty & Bruce Stokes eds., 1998);
Merit E. Janow, A Comparison of Unilateral and Bilateral Experiences in Trade and Anti-
trust Law and Policy, Working Draft Prepared for the Brookings Institution Conference on
Private Practices and Trade Policy (Oct. 1997); see also Thomas 0. Bayard & Kimberly Ann
Elliott, RECIPROCITY AND RETALIATION IN U.S. TRADE POLICY (1994).
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and tangible progress is made to achieve market access in a number of key
sectors. Still further, one might ask, how are we really to judge whether ef-
fective market access has been achieved, and what do we do if import
penetration still remains low after the fact.
IV. BILATERAL AND MULTILATERAL APPROACHES
If the trend in U.S. Japan economic relations is towards bilateral nego-
tiation and cooperation, and away from extraterritorial application of U.S.
antitrust and trade laws, the picture is still not so easy to reconcile. For in-
stance, above I discussed the Japanese cooperation in a fax paper conspir-
acy investigation, but also a strong legal challenge in the United States to
the extraterritorial assertion of U.S. criminal antitrust laws in a related case.
Against this backdrop, it is worth noting that in the multilateral con-
text, both nations have been supportive of a non-binding OECD Council
Recommendation Concerning Effective Action Against Hard Core Cartels
("OECD Recommendation" or "Recommendation"). 1 1 The practical utility
of the Recommendation in resolving U.S.-Japan issues remains to be seen.
However, one thing that is clear is that faced with an import boycott of the
kind at issue in Itoh, the OECD Recommendation would be of little use as
the definition of a "hard core cartel" excludes boycotts. 10 2 Similarly, while
the Members agree that "their laws should provide for effective sanctions,
of a kind and at a level adequate to deter firms and individuals from partici-
pating in such cartels,"'0 3 it is not clear that the OECD Recommendation
will help resolve disputes, such as the one in Nippon, over the appropriate-
ness of criminal sanctions, especially applied extraterritorially.
Perhaps more telling questions arise from what the OECD Recommen-
dation has to say about international cooperation and comity in enforcing
laws prohibiting hard core cartels. The Recommendation recognizes that
Members have a common interest in preventing hard core cartels (providing
that they can mutually agree about when one actually exists), and exhorts
them to seek ways in which cooperation "might be improved by positive
'01 Recomnendation of the OECD Council Concerning Effective Action Against Hard
Core Cartels, C/M(98)7/PROV (adopted by the Council on Mar. 25, 1998).
'02Id., Part I.A.2(a).
A 'hard core cartel' is an anticompetitive agreement, anticompetitive concerted practice,
or anticompetitive arrangement by competitors to fix prices, make rigged bids (collusive
tenders), establish output restrictions or quotas, or share or divide markets by allocating
customers, suppliers, territories or lines of commerce"); id., Part I.A.2(b) ("The hard core
cartel category does not include agreements, concerted practices, or arrangements that (i)
are reasonably related to lawful realization of cost-reducing or output-enhancing efficien-
cies, (ii) are excluded directly or indirectly from the coverage of a Member country's
own laws, or (iii) are authorized in accordance with those laws. However, all exclusions
and authorisations of what would otherwise be hard core cartels should be transparent
and should be reviewed periodically to assess whether they are both necessary and no
broader than necessary to achieve their overriding policy objectives. Id.
'°3 Id., Part I.A.l(a).
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comity principles applicable to requests that another country remedy anti-
competitive conduct that adversely affects both countries, and should con-
duct their own enforcement activities in accordance with principles of
comity when they affect other countries' important interests."' 4 Two
thoughts come to mind. First, this is the first reference to "positive comity"
in a U.S.-Japan context, albeit under the umbrella of a non-binding multi-
lateral agreement.10 5 If that provision works with respect to hard core car-
tels, then it may prove to be a useful tool to help resolve other disputes
between the two countries over private anticompetitive practices. (How-
ever, positive comity seems to suffer from incentive problems so that re-
quests are unlikely to be readily accepted where countries are adverse in
interest.) Second, one wonders how two countries who could not even agree
on the scope of comity in international law in Nippon, will find many suc-
cessful occasions to use the positive comity provisions if they don't agree
on the meaning or scope of "negative" comity.
In May 1999, the Governments of Japan and the United States an-
nounced their intention to conclude a bilateral antitrust cooperation agree-
ment ("Draft Agreement"). 0 6 This is significant because at present Japan
and the United States do not have a bilateral cooperation agreement or a
mutual legal assistance treaty ("MLAT").10 7 However, while the United
States does not now have an MLAT with Japan, it apparently has received,
pursuant to Japan's legal assistance law and more traditional letters roga-
tory, helpful assistance from the Ministry of Justice in certain antitrust en-
forcement matters.10 8
The Draft Agreement contains the following key elements: notification
of enforcement activities; enforcement cooperation and coordination, and
positive comity; positive comity; conflict avoidance, consultations and ex-
'I4Id., Part I.B.l.
1
05The notion of "positive comity" emerged in a 1991 agreement between the United
States and the European Community, Regarding the Application of Their Competition Laws;
See http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/publicintemationaldocsec.txt. (visited Aug. 15, 1999) See
generally, Spencer Weber Waller, The Internationalization of Antitrust Enforcement, 77
B.U. L. REv. 343, 368-70 (1997) So far the only formal positive comity request under the
1991 agreement has been made by the United States in relation to possible anticompetitive
conduct of European airlines that may be preventing U.S.-based airline computer reservation
systems from competing effectively in certain European countries. See U.S. DEP'T OF
JUSTICE, JUSTICE DEPARTMENT ASKS EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES TO INVESTIGATE POSSIBLE
ANTICOMPETITIVE CONDUCT AFFECTING U.S. AIRLINES' COMPUTER RESERVATION SYSTEMS
(Press Release) (Apr. 28, 1997).
106UNITED STATES DEP'T OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES ANNOUNCES SUBSTANTIVE
AGREEMENT ON AN ANTITRUST COOPERATION AGREEMENT WITH JAPAN (Press Release) (May
3, 1999).
107 Principal Dep. Ass't Att. Gen. Antitrust Div., Dep't of Justice, A. Douglas Malamed,
An Important First Step: A U.S./Japan Bilateral Antitrust Cooperation Agreement, Paper
Presented to the Japan Fair Trade Institute (Nov. 12, 1998).
'See id. at 12.
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change of information; and the agreement will be implemented in accor-
dance with existing laws in each country.10 9 With respect to positive comity,
the Draft Agreement does not contain the deferral mechanism that is in-
cluded in the EC/U.S cooperation agreement. 10
The innovative feature of that agreement is provided in Article IV
which sets out a detailed deferral or suspension mechanism under which
one party would "normally" defer or suspend its own enforcement activity
in reliance upon enforcement by the other. This mechanism only applies
where the anticompetitive activities at issue do not have a direct, substantial
and reasonably foreseeable impact on consumers in the requesting country,
or where if they do have such impact, the activities occur principally in and
are directed principally towards the other party's territory. A further condi-
tion for the operation of this mechanism is that the adverse effects can be,
and are likely to be fully and adequately investigated, eliminated, or ade-
quately remedied under the laws of the requested party.
It is not clear from the public record at this stage why there is no defer-
ral mechanism in the Draft Agreement. However, one can only guess that
that the Agencies were skeptical about the prospect of reporting to Congress
that hence forth all antitrust and market access disputes with Japan had been
subcontracted to the JFTC. While the bilateral initiatives discussed above
have emphasized the importance of strengthening the role of the JFTC, and
antitrust enforcement in Japan generally, it probably is still too early to ex-
pect the Agencies to go that far. Their reluctance to do so, however, should
give pause to all of the commentators who have suggested that positive
comity is a solution to market access problems something akin to the "Sec-
ond Coming" in the antitrust religion.
The Draft Agreement is also not a comprehensive antitrust mutual as-
sistance agreement of the sort authorized by the International Antitrust En-
forcement Assistance Act of 1994 ("IAEAA") and recently signed with
Australia.'1 ' An IAEAA agreement would have envisaged the sharing of all
confidential information (except for Hart-Scot-Rodino pre-merger notifica-
tions)'1 2 with Japan if it agreed to reciprocal and equivalent cooperation
such that both country would agree to enforce its laws to assist the other
country without regard to whether the conduct under investigation violates
the law of the requested country.
1 3
109 See supra note 108.
"In April 1998, the United States and the European Communities refined the 1991
Agreement with a further Agreement on the Application of Positive Comity principles in the
Enforcement of Their Competition Laws. See http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/intemational/
docs/1781.htm.
"' See supra note 108.
" 2See 15 U.S.C. § 6204(1).
"
3 See id. § 6202(c).
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And yet there is a deeper cause for questioning the practical utility of
the cooperation provisions of the OECD Recommendation. In this respect
it is worth recalling that the WTO panel case on photographic film began as
a Section 301 petition by the Eastman Kodak Company in 1995. It was the
first - and to this point only - petition accepted by the USTR under the
"toleration or encouragement" provision of Section 301. When the USTR
sought to consult their Japanese counterparts, the Japanese side refused to
hold formal bilateral trade consultations, even after a finding of "unfair-
ness" by the USTR. The Japanese Government insisted that the appropriate
forum in which to air the governmental aspects of the complaint was the
WTO, and the issue of allegedly anticompetitive business practices fell
solely within the jurisdiction of the JFTC. The U.S. side blinked - despite
the clarity of U.S. law in this regard - and the case proceeded to a WTO
panel pursuant to a U.S. request. In addition, the United States called for
consultations on restrictive business practices under a never-used 1960
GATT Contracting Parties Decision ("1960 Decision" or "1960 GATT De-
cision").,1 4 Despite the only three requests ever made under the Decision
- all during 1996 - bilateral consultations were never held. Needless to
say, the 1960 Decision was never used to settle any other Japan-U.S. eco-
nomic dispute.
The 1960 GATT Decision stands along side a panoply on non-binding
OECD Council Recommendations calling for conciliation and consultation
in competition policy related disputes. The closest thing to an international
agreement in respect of competition law matters remains the competition
provisions of the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises ("OECD
Guidelines" or "Guidelines") set forth in the 1976 OECD Declaration on
International Investment and Multinational Enterprises.15 These Guidelines
are, of course, not binding, but they do specify the matters that if made
mandatory, could form the .basis of a limited agreement on substantive
competition law matters. For instance, enterprises are advised to conform
14The GATT was based on the Chapter on Commercial Policy in the Havana Charter for
the International Trade Organization ("ITO") Chapter V of which directly addressed restric-
tive business practices. When it became clear that the Havana Charter would not enter into
force, a Working Party of GATT Contracting Parties in 1954-55 considered proposals to in-
clude provisions along the lines of Chapter V in the GATT. It was agreed to postpone fur-
ther consideration of this pending the outcome of discussions on related issues in the
Economic and Social Council of the United Nations. In 1958, the GATT Contracting Parties
appointed a Group of Experts on whether they should address restrictive business practices
in international trade. In 1960, on the basis of the Report of the Group of Experts, the Con-
tracting Parties adopted a Decision recommending that at the request of any contracting
party, a contracting party should enter into consultations on harmful restrictive practices in
international trade on a bilateral or multilateral basis as appropriate. See generally, WTO
Working Group on the Interaction of Trade and Competition Policy, Competition-Related
Provisions in Existing WTO Agreements: Informal Note by the Secretariat (June 17, 1997).
"15See generally, <http://www.oeed.org/daf/cmis/codes/declaratl .htm>;
<http://www.oecd.org/daf/cmis/cimelmnetext.htm#competition> (visited Aug. 15, 1999).
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to the official competition rules of the countries in which they operate. Spe-
cifically, enterprises are advised to refrain from taking actions that would
adversely affect competition in a relevant market, by abusing market power
or a dominant position with respect to: anticompetitive acquisitions; preda-
tory behavior towards competitors; unreasonable refusals to deal; anticom-
petitive abuse of intellectual property rights; discriminatory pricing,
including transfer pricing; cartel behavior. However, other enumerated
provisions would probably be the subject of intense debate as some relate to
vertical practices which, as discussed above, probably tend not to be anti-
competitive in the absence of market power. Of course, to be operational-
ized, the OECD Guidelines would also probably require intense
negotiations around such issues as binding and enforceable dispute settle-
ment provisions.
Nonetheless, the Committee of Experts on Restrictive Business Prac-
fices of the OECD has prepared several recommendations on cooperation
between member states on restrictive business practices affecting interna-
tional trade that have been adopted by the Council of the OECD. The rec-
ommendation of July 20, 1978 provided for inter-governmental cooperation
on a purely voluntary basis without impairment of sovereignty and in ac-
cordance with each state's laws and policies in the following areas: investi-
gation and discovery, exchange of information, coordination and
cooperation.' 16 In 1984, at a ministerial meeting to review the 1976 Guide-
lines for Multinational Enterprises as amended in 1979, the ministers en-
dorsed certain general considerations and practical approaches dealing with
conflicting legal requirements. ' 17 In 1995, the OECD revised its Recom-
mendation Concerning Co-operation Between Member Countries on Anti-
competitve Practices Affecting International Trade ("1995
Recommendation"). 18 The 1995 Recommendation emphasizes coordina-
tion of investigations, and assistance in an investigation or proceeding in a
member country; strengthens the protections for confidentiality informa-
tion; and specifies more detail to be included in merger investigations.
The point is simple. Japan and the United States are already tied into a
network of non-binding multilateral trade and antitrust agreements that do
not seem to have played a prominent role in the settling of any of their dis-
putes about either public or private restrictive trade practices.
116 OECD Council Recommendation Concerning Action Against Restrictive Business
Practices Affecting International Trade Including Those Involving Multinational Enterprises
See <http://www.oecd.org/daf/clp/rec3com.htm> (visited Aug. 15, 1999).
117 The relevant OECD recommendations can be found via the Internet, see <http://www.
oecd.org/daf/cmis/codes/declaratl.htm>; <http:www.oecd.org/daf/cmis/cime/conflict.htm>
(visited on Aug. 15, 1999).
18 See <http://www.oecd.org/daf/clp/rec8com.htm> (visited on Aug. 15, 1999). The
1995 Recommendation replaced the 1986 Recommendation, which itself had replaced the
1979 version of the Recommendation.
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V. CONCLUSIONS
In short, the existence of non-binding multilateral competition rules or
frameworks for dispute settlement have not shown much prominence in Ja-
pan-U.S. economic relations to this point. Not surprisingly, therefore the
United States has not abandoned potential recourse to the extraterritorial
application of its trade and antitrust laws to address perceived public and
private anticompetitive practices in Japan. Japan for its part has shown a
willingness to enter into the formal WTO dispute settlement mechanisms
where it feels protected from the capriciousness of U.S. unilateral action.
Lying somewhere along this continuum is the current emphasis on bilateral
negotiated outcomes. The question that emerges is whether that point can
represent a stable equilibrium over time. It is worth considering whether a
stable equilibrium would be better provided by some measure of negotiated
multilateral minimum competition rules backed up by multilateral dispute
mechanisms. 119 Such an approach might offer Japan the comfort that it
seeks from unilateralism, while providing the United States with the en-
forceable market principles that it seeks. This multilateral approach would
require Japan to challenge the United States to seek more than non-binding
consultations or cooperation, but it would also require the United States to
challenge Japan to commit itself once and for all to the establishment of an
open and competitive domestic market.
120
"9 C.f. The Proposal of the Coalition for Open Trade (COT) Addressing Private Re-
straints of Trade: Industries and Governments Search for Answers Regarding Trade-And-
Competition Policy 32 (Sept. 1997) (proposing to amend Section 301 "to give the USTR
authority to take appropriate action to eliminate foreign 'restrictive business practices' that
burden U.S. commerce [by giving] .... USTR authority to issue cease and desist orders di-
recting foreign enterprises to halt such practices or eliminate the burden that they place on
U.S. commerce, and in case of violations of cease and desist orders, to seek civil penalties
and injunctive relief in federal district court")
120See Ambassador Charlene Barchefsky, Keynote Address: The Global Trading System.
A GATT 50th Anniversary Forum, The Brookings Institution, at 6 (Mar. 4, 1998):
It has been a long-held theory among many countries that sound competition law en-
forcement is crucial to the health of national economies. Indeed, economic globalization
has dramatically increased the importance of strong competition policies due to the in-
creased risk of international cartels and the tremendous growth in transnational mergers.
Reaching agreement on competition policy within the WTO will be difficult, given the
great disparity between countries on antitrust rules - both in substance and in the vigi-
lance of their enforcement - and the fact that half of the WTO members do not have
competition laws of their own. What is critical, however, is that we develop an interna-
tional culture of competition and sound antitrust enforcement, built on the basis of shared
experience, bilateral cooperation and technical assistance. From that base we should fo-
cus on those particular practices and industries where the most egregious anticompetitive
practices have been concentrated. If we can do that, we will have a solid foundation from
which to build a more comprehensive regulatory framework for competition policy.
